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RUNNING COVENANTS AND PUBLIC
POLICY
Olin L. Browder*

When first encountering covenants running with the land,
one may react against the very idea. Why should any person be
able to enforce a promise not made to him or be bound by a
promise he did not make? Modern contract law, particularly the
rules about the assignment of contract rights and the rights of
third-party beneficiaries, may answer the first question, but does
not explain how anyone can be bound by a promise neither expressly nor impliedly made or consented to by him.
On the other hand, persons_ familiar with easements, liens,
or mortgages understand that land ownership can be subject to
and burdened by property interests in other persons, so that successive owners are subject to burdens they did not create. That a
landowner's promise may be similarly binding is not startling.
Technically, a mere promise does not create an easement or a
lien; but we all know of cases in which promissory language was
held to create an easement.
Under traditional concepts, a purely negative or restrictive
promise is hardly distinguishable from a negative easement; both
obligate a person not to do something. But an affirmative promise
differs from an affirmative easement. An affirmative easement
entitles its owner to do something to or on, or to make some
limited use of, the servient owner's land, while an affirmative
promise obligates the promisor to do something for the benefit of
the promisee or his land. Yet unless it offends some policy, no
reason exists why the concept of an easement could not be enlarged to include interests which stem technically from promises,
as the courts occasionally have held. 1 The novelty of such an idea
would not be thought today an objection unless an objection on
the ground of novelty were merely a way of expressing some other
less-easily defined policy. Whether there ever was such a policy
or whether there should be now is one of the questions addressed
by this Article.
To explain the running of covenants by likening them to
easements, we must initially ask how any interest in or burden
* James V. Campbell Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1935, LL.B.
1937, University of Illinois; S.J.D. 1941, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1. E.g., Hottell v. Farmers' Protective Assn., 25 Colo. 67, 53 P. 327 (1898).
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upon land benefits or binds succe~sors of the original parties. At
least in respect to covenants, the basic requirements, which are
now accepted as almost Sl:lcrosanct, were expressed long ago in
Spencer's Case: 2 the covenanting parties must intend that the
covenant run with the land, 3 and the covenant must "touch and
concern" land. Whether these two requirements are or should be
distinct, or merely demand the same thing in two ways, deserves
attention in due course. If liens or mortgages rather than easements (or in addition to easements) are an analogy, why cannot
the original parties to a covenant explicitly burden land in ways
that would otherwise be purely personal? That is, can the parties
cause burdens to touch and concern land merely by agreement?
For the present, one can assert that the idea of being bound
by a promise one has not made, instead of producing an instinctive negative reaction, may in respect to promises that concern
land in fact produce a reaction that takes such a result as a
matter of course, if not of necessity. This idea, while not easily
defined, may appear even to a layman as fundamental and not
as merely technical or conceptual. It was expressed both in
Spencer's Case, 4 involving relations between landlords and tenants, and much later in Tulk v. Moxhay, 5 where the running of
restrictive burdens was decreed in equity. It expresses a revulsion
against permitting a person to contract for a burden respecting
his land, only to have that burden disappear the l.llinute he transfers his land to someone else.
So far, we have been thinking about why covenants burdening land should run in any case, that is, what considerations
impel the conclusion that at least some covenants ought to run
with land? On the other hand, one can ask, assuming that the
usual ingredients are present, what factors should impel the conclusion that some covenants, in some circumstances, should not
run? This question, of course, introduces considerations of public
policy. Rarely, however, is that question put so simply and directly. One gets the impression from much of the existing doctrine
that vague, undefined policies underlie the courts' formulation or
application of rules that,are not asserted in policy terms. Al2. 5 Co. 16a, 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (Q.B. 1583).
3. In fact, the court did not declare a rule of intention as such, but questioned
whether an assignee is bound merely by being designated, that is, by a covenant that
purports to bind the covenantor and his assigns. The court resolved that the assignee will
not be bound even where named unless the covenant pertains to a thing "in esse." 77 Eng.
Rep. at 74.
4. 77 Eng. Rep. at 74.
5. 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144 (Ch. 1848).
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though at various times and places the running of benefits and
of burdens have been treated identically, it now seems to be generally conceded that few policy considerations apply to the former. It is with the latter that this Article is primarily concerned.
In proceeding with this purpose, it seems desirable to examine both English and American case law in search of declared or
implied policy forces, with special emphasis on whether certain
rules, if indeed they are rules of public policy, really serve any
policy, and to conclude with an assessment of where today's
courts ought to stand on the limits to running covenants. It will
be seen, if one reads further, that he will be going over old ground
and hearing old drums of criticism. But I will not be beating dead
horses, for these old horses are still alive. I hope to avoid belaboring such matters more than is necessary to serve my purpose,
which is not to survey once more the law on covenants running
with the land.
In further limitation, very little will be done with that part
of the subject dealing with the relations between landlord and
tenant, and only to a limited extent with that largest part of the
modern law, the rules relating to equitable servitudes, where the
courts have pretty well spun themselves free of old impediments.
If you wonder whether anything is left worth talking about, the
stated purpose of this Article is the only answer, which if you are
willing to persevere, will be elaborated further.
THE

ENGLISH LAW

A distinguished company of scholars has explored with impressive erudition and some disagreement the dim mists of medieval English law for the origin of the running of covenants. 8 There
is no reason here to attempt to shed any more light on that subject. Some legal scholars believe that running covenants sprang
from early warranties (expressed or implied). 7 It seems established that the early covenants long anteceded the modern elements of contract law; running covenants are in essence, therefore, a part of the law of property, not an adaptation or extension
of contract principles to property law. Professor Bordwell asserted
6. C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTEREsTS WmcH "RUN WITH THE LANo" 92·
143 (2d ed. 1947); 0. HoL?.IEB, Tm: COMMON LAw 371-409 (1881); H. S1Ms, COVENANTS
WHICH RUN WITH LAND 45-57 (1901); Bordwell, The Running of Covenants-No Anomaly
(pts. 1-2), 36 IowA L. REv. 1, 484 (1950-1951); Sims, The Law of Real Covenants: Exceptions to the Restatement of the Subject by the American Law Institute, 30 CORNELL L.Q.
1 (1944).

7. 0. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 371-409; H.

S1MS,

supra note 6, at 45-57.
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that in contrast to the creation in equity of the "us.e," which was
used at law in developing the doctrine of estates, "the idea that
an obligation could be illlposed on or follow the land did not
originate with equity but was the very heart of the feudal system. "8 Bordwell put the question: "Was it [the running covenant] a real contribution of the Middle Ages to the law comparable to, but of much less importance than, the trust or the estate,
or on the other hand, is it an outworn relic of feudalism to be kept
within bounds?" His own reply: "The thesis of this article is that
it was a real contribution and no anomaly." 9
Both Bordwell and Judge Clark contended that the early
requirement of "privity of estate" for the running of covenants
meant what we now call "vertical privity," that is, the relation
between the original parties to a covenant and their respective
successors rather than the relation between the covenanting parties themselves. 10 In any case, most if not all scholars agree that
prior to the nineteenth century the running of both benefits and
burdens of covenants between owners in fee simple was taken for
granted, if not judicially established. Any remaining doubt on the
point probably results from the fact that the question of covenants regarding fee estates did not often arise, for the early law
was mainly concerned with the running of covenants between
landlords and tenants, as reflected in 32 Henry VIII c.34 and in
Spencer's Case. 11
Lord Kenyon's statement in Webb v. Russell is the source of
modern concern with privity of estate: "It is not sufficient that a
covenant is concerning the land, but, in order to make it run with
the land, there must be privity of estate between the covenanting
parties." 12 Unfortunately, he did not say why this was so, nor
explain what he meant by privity. In fact, Professor Bordwell
pointed out that Lord Kenyon abandoned his proposition a year
later and rested the rule of Webb v. Russell upon another
ground. 13 It is therefore all the more remarkable that American
courts have relied on Lord Kenyon's dictum more often than upon
any of the later English cases that infused meaning into the privity requirement. This is, of course, the familiar judicial device of
relying on an ambiguous requirement to support a court's own
8. Bordwell, supra note 6, at 9.
9. Id. at 8.
10. Id. at 488; C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 111.
11. 5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q. B. 1583).
12. 3 T.R. 393, 100 Eng. Rep. 639, 644 (K.B. 1789).
13. Bordwell, supra note 6, at 492 n.57.
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meaning, although in this instance that is not the meaning later
supplied by the English courts.
A policy requirement was at length imposed upon the running of covenants in Keppell v. Bailey. 14 The court stated that the
required privity was satisfied only where a landlord-tenant relation existed between the covenanting parties. Alert to the English
rule that only certain recognized appurtenant easements could be
created, the court deplored the suggestion that landowners could
burden their land in any imaginable way. The court could have
specified certain permissible kinds of running covenants, as had
been done with easements, but instead asserted its opposition to
"incidents of a novel kind" as a reason to reject them all.
The court seemed primarily concerned, however, that purchasers should not be bound by a variety of covenants of which
they had no knowledge. That policy produced the American recording statutes, which should make Keppell's rule irrelevant in
this country. The virtual absence of similar statutes in England
makes the Keppell court's concern at least understandable, but
it seems very strange that the court asserted that policy in
Keppell, where the parties had actual notice of the covenant. The
court simply said that to permit the running of burdens in equity
even against purchasers with notice would subvert the rule at law.
The last point could not endure, and· of course it did not, for
soon thereafter the court in Tulk v. Moxhay 15 announced the now
universally accepted doctrine that restrictive burdens of covenants between owners in fee will be specifically enforced in equity
against purchasers with notice of the restriction. 18 The court
foreshadowed future difficulties, however, by the way it stated its
holding. In dismissing as irrelevant any rule on running covenants
at common law, the court gave the impression that it was announcing an entirely new doctrine in which purchase with notice
was the basis for enforcement. Actually the court seems merely
to have followed a familiar maneuver of a court of equity by
mitigating the undue rigors of the common law. Thus the burden
of a restrictive covenant runs in equity except against a purchaser
without notice. 17 The court said nothing specific about the traditional requirements of intention and touching and concerning,
but rarely does a restrictive covenant not touch and concern land
14. 2 My. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834).
15. 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
16. The rule of Tulk v. Moxhay had been previously applied in Whatman v. Gibson,
9 Sim. 196, 59 Eng. Rep. 333 (Ch. 1838).
17. London & S.W. Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562, 583 (1882).
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in some way. The covenant in Tulk to maintain land in an open
state obviously touches and concerns that land. At least those
American courts that have followed Tulk v. Moxhay have not
been fooled in this regard; and either assume, assert, or impose
the touch and concern requirement. In short, mere notice surely
does not bind one to every promise made by a predecessor in title.
On the other side of this coin, it has been asserted that a
running covenant at common law will bind a subsequent purchaser even if he takes without notice. This proposition, if it was
ever true, causes little difficulty in England because no burdening
covenant will run at law in that country except in the landlordtenant relation. It should certainly not be true in this country
under any reasonable interpretation of the recording statutes.
The final question in the development of the English law on
running covenants was whether the rul~ of Tulk v. Moxhay extended to affirmative burdens. We should note initially that some
nominally affirmative covenants can be enforced negatively, that
is, by injunction. So it was in Tulk v. Moxhay, where the covenant to "maintain" certain land in an open state without buildings was enforced by an injunction against erecting buildings. As
to truly affirmative burdens, the medieval law, which scholars
say did not prohibit the running of burdens at law with fee estates, did not distinguish between them and restrictive burdens.
In fact, most of the very early covenants were affi~mative, including but not limited to the so-called "spurious easements," 18 such
as a covenant to maintain fences. Even after Tulk v. Moxhay, the
court in Cooke v. Chilcott19 paid little heed to the distinction and
enforced against a pur_chaser with notice a promise to provide
spring water to houses on lands retained after a conveyance of the
land to be burdened. In response to the defendant's contention
that he was not bound to supply water to anyone, the court noted
that houses which had been erected in reliance on the promise
would otherwise be left without water, and then declared, "It
would be perfectly monstrous that such a defense should be allowed."20 This sounds very much like the reason given by the
court in Tulk v. Moxhay why a purchaser with notice should not
take free of a restrictive covenant. To avoid the difficulty of supervising a mandatory injunction, as would be necessary to enforce an affirmative covenant, the Chilcott court simply enjoined
the defendant, under pain of contempt of court, against allowing
18. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 875 (3d ed. 1966).
19. 3 Ch. D. 694 (1876).
20. 3 Ch. D. at 701.
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conditions to exist that would interfere with the performance of
the covenant.
Nevertheless, this solution did not survive even as long as
Keppell's dictum against the enforcement of restrictive burdens
in equity. The court in Haywood v. Brunswick Building Society 21
held that Tulk could not be extended to enforce a covenant to
build and keep in repair. This holding was confirmed in
Austerberry v. Oldham, 22 where one judge remarked that a covenant will not run, except between landlord and tenant, unless it
amounts to the grant of an easement or a rent-charge.23 In fact,
one of the judges in Haywood had conceded the possibility that
an equitable charge could attach to and run with land. 24 This
concession is significant in the light of the Haywood judges' reasons for refusing to extend Tulk v. Moxhay. One judge claimed
that extending Tulk would make a new equity, "which we cannot do, " 25 despite the fact that they had done exactly that in
Tulk v. Moxhay. Although one judge admitted that the old rule
against mandatory injunctions no longer applied, 28 another said,
"The covenant to repair can only be enforced by making the
owner put his hand into his pocket, and there is nothing which
would justify us going to that length. " 27 A third judge said "that
only such a covenant as can be applied without expenditure of
money will be enforced against the assignee on the ground of
notice." 28 Notwithstanding the court's emphasis, London &
Southwest Railway v. Gomm 29 subsequently· made it clear that
the Haywood prohibition extends to all affirmative burdens, not
merely those requiring the expenditure of money.
So the English law, when considered all together, is clear
enough. Essentially, affirmative burdens will not run either at
law or in equity. That one cannot get damages for breach even of
a restrictive covenant against anyone other than the promisor is
of little significance, so long as one can by injunction specifically
compel performance.
A search for the reasons for such a law, however, only leads
one into the typical terse inscrutability of the English judges. The
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

8 Q.B.D. 403 (1881).
29 Ch. D. 750 (C.A. 1885).
29 Ch. D. at 781.
8 Q.B.D. at 409.
8 Q.B.D. at 408.
8 Q.B.D. at 408.
8 Q.B.D. at 409.
8 Q.B.D. at 410.
20 Ch. D. 562 (1882).
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remarks of the judges about compelling persons to dig into their
pockets or expend money may be a simple, offhand, almost trivial
way of turning a· phrase, and so sharpen the distinction in fact
between an affirmative and restrictive covenant. But it is hardly
an explanation.
It may not be irrelevant to mention the comment of Messrs.
Megarry and Wade30 that the rule against the running of the
burden of any covenant at law can be evaded in two ways. First,
if the conveyers insert the original covenant in each successive
conveyance of the land of a covenantor, the effect is obviously the
same as if the original covenant ran with the land. Second, the
Law of Property Act of 1925 allows a long-term lease to be converted into a fee simple; when so converted, the estate is subject
to all the covenants that existed under the lease.
What policy is really served by this law? Is it merely respect
for and the authority of English judges, that once they firmly
state a conclusion, even if with only offhand justifications, no
one thereafter even considers inquiring further? If we in this country are left to speculate, do the English courts still worry about
the administrative difficulties of enforcing affirmative duties? Or
does the English law embody a general assessment that affirmative burdens are simply more onerous than restrictive burdens?
It can certainly be denied that all affirmative burdens are greater
than all restrictive ones. Even if they were, is there some reason
· why such greater burdens should not be borne? Do the English
courts tacitly assume that the greater the burden the greater the
restraint on alienation, and that somewhere a line must be
drawn?
THE .AMERICAN LAW

The early American cases, like the early English cases, assumed that the burden of covenants would run with estates in fee
simple both at law and in equity.31 Most of the early American
cases, like the early English cases, involved affirmative covenants. In those days, the prevalent concern was not with the
regulation of urban subdivisions, but with the building and repair
of fences, bridges, and water power facilities. As more restrictive
covenants appeared, at least one point became clear: the eventual
30. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 18, at 751.
31. Dorsey v. St. Louis, A., & T.H. R.R., 58 Ill. 65 (1871); Carr v. Lowry's Admrx.,
27 Pa. 257 (1856); Kellogg v. Robinson, 6 Vt. 276 (1834).
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general acceptance of the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay. 32 In due
course, the courts have managed reasonably well to adapt the
doctrine of equitable servitudes to modern needs. The running of
affirmative burdens in equity and the running of all kinds of
burdens at law is another story.
When the later English law began to creep into this country,
the American ·courts reacted in a fascinating but perplexing manner. We can never know whether the American courts misunderstood the English cases or deliberately distorted them, but we at
least know that they found the total prohibition of the running
of affirmative burdens unacceptable. At any rate, only a few
American courts acknowledged that the English rule prohibited
the running of affirmative burdens and applied that rule. New
York set the most celebrated example in Miller v. Clary by announcing a rule against the running of affirmative burdens. 33 It
is striking, however, that Miller was not decided until 1913, after
the New York courts had allowed affirmative burdens to run
throughout the nineteenth century. Prior contrary decisions were
classified as exceptions, a foreshadowing that other exceptions
might subsequently appear. In fact, more exceptions did appear,
which led commentators to suggest that the court had so qualified
its doctrine that it would eventually treat Miller v. Clary as an
aberration and abandon it altogether. That Miller has not been
abandoned deserves further attention in due course.
New Jersey rejected the running of affirmative burdens in
early cases, 34 but its superior court has recently modified if not
abandoned that course. 35 Ignoring the doctrine of Tulk v.
Moxhay; an early Virginia case36 applied the English commonlaw rule to deny an injunction against the violation of a restrictive
covenant. The decision, however, also rested on the ground that
the restriction was an unlawful restraint of trade. More recently,
the West Virginia court37 asserted the English rule to deny an heir
of the covenantor the recovery of oil and gas royalties, but it also
seemed to rely on the ground that the covenant did not touch and
concern the land. Dictum in an early Rhode Island case declared
32. See Sims, supra note 6, at 19-27.
33. 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913).
34. See cases cited in Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 155, 160-61, 283
A.2d 911, 914 (Ch. Div. 1971).
35. Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (Ch. Div. 1971).
36. Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 562 (1886).
37. McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W.Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d 607 (1943); cf. Cole v. Seamonde, 87
W.Va. 19, 104 S.E. 747 (1920) (recognizing enforceability of equitable servitude against
purchaser with notice).
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that the English rule prevented the running of a covenant at law,
but not in equity.38
THE PRIVITY PROBLEM

The English rule was first significantly modified tit an early
date in Massachusetts. Reasoning by analogy from the English
common-law rule requiring privity_ of estate between the covenanting parties, which in England could only be satisfied by a
landlord-tenant relation, the court declared that the existence in
one of the parties of an easement in the land of the other party
sufficed to create privity of estate. 39 This has been called "substituted privity." 40 Signs of this rule have appeared in several
other states.41 An early case in Wisconsin, 42 for example, held that
the privity requirement was satisfied because the parties were
tenants in common of mineral interests.
The most perplexing American development was the appearance and growth of the notion of privity of estate as a requirement
that for a covenant to run it must be accompanied by a conveyance of affected land from one of the covenanting parties to the
other. This has been called "instantaneous privity. " 43 It is unclear
whether this idea was a drastic effort to reduce the rigors of the
English law or was purely indigenous. At any rate, courts have
sometimes supported it simply with the old dictum in Webb v.
Russell, 44 though Lord Kenyon surely did not have this meaning
in mind. In later cases it became the accepted meaning of the
privity requirement, although I know of no case in which the court
even intimated that it was declaring new law.
The rule appeared almost surreptitiously· and spread very
gradually. Mr. Sims suggested that it may have originated in the
old implied covenants of title from which, it has been argued,
modem covenants were derived. 45 It may also have grown from a
misunderstanding of the Massachusetts notion of privity, which
38. Town of Middletown v. Newport Hosp., 16 R.I. 319, 332, 15 A. 800, 803 (1888).
39. Morse v. Aldrich, 36 Mass. 449, 454 (1837). See Hurd v. Curtis, 36 Mass. 459, 464
(1837). In an early case, the Massachusetts court did not impose any privity requirements
in applying the rule of Tulk v. Moxhay to a restrictive covenant. Parker v. Nightingale,
88 Mass. 341 (1863).
40. C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 128.
41. Id. at 130 n.116.
42. Crawford v. Witherbee, 77 Wis. 419, 46 N.W. 545 (1890).
43. 2 AMErucAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
44. 3 T.R. 393, 100 Eng. Rep. 639, 644 (K.B. 1789).
45. H. SIMS, supra note 6, at 195.
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permitted the creation of an easement by the same instrument
that contained the covenant. In Hurd v. Curtis, the Massachusetts court said, "Their [the covenanting parties'] estates were
several, and there was no grant of any interest in the real estate
of either party, to which the covenants could be annexed." 46 This
statement may have motivated a New York court's citation of
Hurd v. Curtis for the proposition that "[t]he true distinction
appears to be that if the covenant is made on the sale of property,
in a case like the present, it runs with the land. " 47
It was surprising to me that the first clear declaration of the
rule of instantaneous privity that I have seen was a dictum in an
Arkansas 48 case involving the running of a covenant for title,
though the dictum seems broadly enough stated to cover all covenants. Sixteen years later a Wisconsin court casually mentioned
the privity rule as a ground for permitting the running of the
burden of a covenant to share the expenses of repairing a dam. 49
After several more years, the privity requirement was imposed in
Maine to prevent the running of the burden of another affirmative covenant. 50 One year later in another affirmative burden
case, the New Hampshire court51 cited the earlier Wisconsin case
in recognition of the privity requirement. The most famous case
cited to stand for instantaneous privity is Wheeler v. Schad, GZ
although the opinion leaves some doubt whether the court asserted that rule or the Massachusetts rule.
In due course the rule requiring a grant between the covenanting parties was accepted in a substantial number of jurisdictions, 53 but I know of no court that has attempted to explain or
justify the rule in terms of public policy. Three states passed
statutes which were probably derived from the Field Code and
which provide that "certain covenants, contained in grants of
estates in real property, are appurtenant to such estates . . . .
Such covenants are said to run with the land. " 54 According to the
46. 36 Mass. 459, 464 (1837).
47. Denman v. Prince, 40 Barb. 213, 216 (N.Y. 1862).
48. Ross v. Turner, 7 Ark. 132, 145 (1846).
49. Wooliscroft v. Norton, 15 Wis. 198 (1862).
50. Smith v. Kelley, 56 Me. 64 (1868).
51. Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N.H. 475 (1869).
52. 7 Nev. 204 (1871).
53. 5 R. POWELL, REAL PRoPERTY ,r 674 at 176 (1949). Several recent cases recognize
the rule: Carlson v. Libby, 137 Conn. 362, 77 A.2d 332 (1950); Johnson v. Myers, 226 Ga.
23, 172 S.E.2d 421 (1970); Hall v. Risley, 188 Or. 69,213 P.2d 818 (1950); Clear Lake Apts.,
Inc. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 537 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), affd. sub nom. Clear
Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977).
54. MONT. REv. CODE§ 58-304 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-04-24 (1960); S.D. COMP,

November 1978)

Running Covenants

23

Montana court, that statute bars the running of any covenant not
contained in the grant of the real property to be charged. 55 Presumably a similar provision once appeared in the California Civil
Code. If so, it has been amended to provide the opposite, 56 that
is, that landowners not otherwise associated· can make a running
covenant. In a few states this privity rule has been rejected or
been ignored in cases where it would be applicable. 57 This leaves
probably a majority of the states in which the need for some kind
of horizontal privity has not been decided.
Even under the English rule, which requires privity by tenure, an affirmative burden can be cast in the form. of a lien,
thereby avoiding a privity problem. The New York court in the
famous Neponsit case58 did not allow its rule against the running
of affirmative burdens to prevent the enforcement of a lien given
to secure payment for services to property. Of course not every
affirmative covenant will be construed as a lien, but in the Montana case59 mentioned above the court did just that when it said
that one who intends to bind his land or successors to such a
burden in substance creates a lien. The Mississippi court rather
recently held the same. 60 In addition, a court confused by the
conceptual distinctions between easements and covenants may
construe a promise to furnish water from a reservoir to the promisee's reservoir, pipeline, or ditch as an easement in the promisee.
The court would thereby avoid any problem about privity. 61
It is widely assumed that under the rule of Tulk v. Moxhay
the instantaneous privity requirement does not bar the equitable
enforcement of covenants against takers of the promisor's land
with notice. This assumption follows naturally from the Tulk
court's notion that the rule of its case had nothing to do with
running covenants. That notion is conceptually· supported by the
LAws § 43-12-1 (1967).
55. Orchard Home11 Ditch Co. v. Snavely, 117 Mont. 484, 159 P.2d 521 (1945).
56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468 (West Supp. 1978).
57. E.g., Mueller v. Bankers Trust Co., 262 Mich. 53,247 N.W. 103 (1933); Bolles v.
Pecos lrrig. Co., 23 N.M. 32, 167 P. 280 (1917); Norfleet v. Cromwell, 64 N.C. 1 (1870);
Hom v. Miller, 136 Pa. 640, 20 A. 706 (1890).
58. Neponsit Property Owners' Assn. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248,
15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
59. Orchard Homes Ditch Co. v. Snavely, 117 Mont. 484, 159 P.2d 521 (1945).
60. Mendrop v. Harrell, 233 Miss. 679, 103 So. 2d 418 (1958). See also Burton-Jones
Dev., Inc. v. Flake, 368 Mich. 122, 117 N.W.2d 110 (1962); 2 .AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY
§ 9.17 n.2 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
61. Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Or. 185,344 P.2d 221 (1959); cf. Farmers' High Line
Canal & Reservoir Co. v. New Hampshire Real Estate Co.,-40 Colo. 467, 92 P. 290 (1907)
(covenants in lease for irrigation-ditch owner to supply water to surrounding landowners
created easement).
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theory that an equitable servitude, at least if restrictive, is an
equitable easement created by a promise. Some cases expressly
recognize the inapplicability in equity of any privity requirement, 62 and I know of no authority to the contrary. The question
seldom arises, however, for equitable servitudes are usually created by conveyances of one or more parcels of land. A suit for a
declaratory judgment, however, can cloud any substantive issue,
including this one, and a recent Georgia court, without any recognition of the possibility of equitable enforcement, declared a restrictive promise of one landowner to his neighbor null and void
for want of privity of estate. 63
Except in New York and possibly New Jersey, the American
rules governing the running of covenants at law have been applied
indiscriminately to both negative and affirmative covenants, as
would be expected where "privity" means something very different from the English rule that no burden can run at law except
between landlord and tenant. Only rather recently has the question been raised whether affirmative burdens also run in equity
against purchasers with notice. We have seen that the English
authority is well established against such an extension of Tulk v.
Moxhay. 64 The prevalent notion of the American courts that English law concerned only privity, and not the running of affirmative burdens, made it easy for them to ignore the full import of
the English cases. Yet as recently as the appearance of his famous
book, 65 Judge Clark cautiously admonished that "it would seem
desirable to consider these interests [equitable servitudes] as
restricted to easements, to uphold them only as negative restrictions, and to allow the affirmative running encumbrances to wait
upon the development of a more enlightened policy towards the
covenant running with the land." Judge Clark must have had in
mind the conceptual difficulty of treating an affirmative burden
as an easement. Nevertheless, the American courts have virtually
ignored the English rule in this regard, and over a considerable
time have extended the Tulk doctrine to affirmative burdens, 66
62. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Riviera Estates Assn., 7 Cal. App. 3d 449, 344 P,2d
221, 87 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1970); Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Or. 185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959);
Clear Lake Apts., Inc. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 537 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), affd.
sub nom. Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.
1977).
63. Johnson v. Myers, 226 Ga. 23, 172 S.E.2d 421 (1970).
64. Haywood v. Brunswick Bldg. Socy., 8 Q.B.D. 403 (1881).
65. C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 180.
66. Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Assn., 258 Ark. 757, 528 S.W.2d 651
(1975); Coulter v. Sausalito Bay Water Co., 122 Cal. App. 480, 10 P.2d 780 (1932); Hottell
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although an occasional failure to meet the touching and concerning requirement bars the result. 67
Those who have surveyed the American developments this
far will be struck by the absurdity of the American privity requirements. Noting the dearth of explanations by the courts of
those rules in policy terms, what policy do they serve? Were these
developments merely efforts to liberalize the English strictures as
much as possible without denying altogether that as fetters on
alienability running covenants ought to be discouraged? If so,
how significant is a doctrine that does not apply to most cases
even at law, and that neighboring landowners in most jurisdictions can evade by "strawman" conveyances? And if affirmative
burdens do run in equity, have not the privity rules virtually
become a dead letter?
The thought occurred to me that courts might have unconsciously supported the instantaneous privity rule on the ground
that the recording of the convenanting parties' conveyance assures ~hat the covenantor's successors will receive adequate notice of.the covenant. 68 This of course assumes that a mere agreement oetween landowners without a conveyance will not be recorded or indeed may not be entitled to record. It further assumes
that an unrecorded covenant binds a successor without notice.
This notion about recording implies that a covenant at law creates no property interest and so is not a conveyance. The answer
is not to circumscribe reasonable arrangements between neighboring landowners by a so-called privity requirement. Many
courts will consider covenants respecting land recordable as
v. Farmers' Protective Assn., 25 Colo. 67, 63 P. 327 (1898); Everett Factories & Terminal
Corp. v. Oldetyme Distillers Corp., 300 Mass. 499, 16 N.E.2d 829 (1938); Greenspan v.
Rehberg, 57 Mich. App. 310, 224 N.W.2d 67 (1974); Mendrop v. Harrell, 233 Miss. 679,
103 So. 2d 418 (1958); Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Or. 185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959); Ball v.
Rio Grande Canal Co., 266 S.W. 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); West Va. Transp. Co.·v. Ohio
River Pipe Line Co., 22 W.Va. 600 (1883); see Murphy v. Kerr, 6 F.2d 908, 911 (8th Cir.
1925); Pittsburg, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bosworth, 46 Ohio St. 81, 86, 18 N.E. 533,535 (1888).
In Fitzstephens v. Watson the court spoke in general terms about the running of affirmative covenants in equity, but in fact the covenant was enforced negatively, by injunction,
as in Tulk v. Moxhay. Other cases could be cited in which courts spoke as though they
were enforcing affirmative burdens, but in which enforcement was decreed by injunction.
67. Clear Lake Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 649 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. 1977);
Cole v. Seamonds, 87 W.Va. 19 (1920).
68. In Sjoblom v. Mark, 103 Minn. 193, 202-03, 114 N.W. 746, 750 (1908), the court
held that a covenant between neighboring landowners not to sell liquor, if recorded, could
n9t give notice because it created no interest in land. If the covenant WP.re otherwise
enforceable in equity, such a view is objectionable and probably does not now prevail; but
the court added that its view would be otherwise if the covenant were embraced in a deed.
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transactions "affecting" title to land. 69 In jurisdictions with recording laws that require a "conveyance," due regard for the
spirit and purpose of recording laws should permit a sufficiently
liberal construction of the word. If not, the recording statutes
could be amended. The Restatement has taken this position. 70
In view of the American developments outlined above, it is
striking that the Restatement declared a rule of privity in the
alternative: that satisfaction of either the Massachusetts or the
instantaneous variety suffices as privity at law. 71 The Restatement's rule was greeted by the indignant outcries of commentators, most notably the polemics of Judge Clark. 72 As long as
the American Law Institute felt free to take liberties with the
law in declaring alternative rules, why did it declare any privity
requirement at all? It is hardly a sufficient rationale to say that
a rejection of the English requirement of a landlord-tenant relation requires a substitution of some other community of interest
between the covenanting parties.
It has not been my purpose here merely to belabor once more
the old controversies about privity of estate. I have been searching for some relevant, defensible considerations of public policy.
The English rule, for some unstated reason, seems to find affirmative burdens objectionable. In its generality that notion has
been rejected in this country. So far, no other has been found.
THE RUNNING OF AFFIRMATIVE BURDENS

After a considerable period of silence following the New York
court's declaration against the running of affirmative burdens
(presumably both at law and in equity) in Miller v. Clary, 73 the
court in Neponsit 14 upheld the running of a subdivision lotowner's promise to contribute to the cost of maintaining facilities
for the benefit of all the lot owners. The court made no attempt
69. Malicke v. Milan, 320 Mich. 65, 30 N.W.2d 440 (1948), reud., reh. den., per
curiam, 320 Mich. 65, 32 N.W.2d 353 (1948); Cook v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 281
S.W.2d 415 (Mo. App. 1955); Loeb v. Watkins, 428 Pa. 480, 240 A.2d 513 (1968); Annot.,
4 A.L.R.2d 1419 (1949). But see Sjoblom v. Mark, 103 Minn. 193, 114 N.W. 746 (1908).
70. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 533 (1944); cf. UNIFORM SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND
TRANSFERS ACT § 2-301 (would abolish all restrictions on eligibility for recording of document except ability to be processed by equipment in recording office).
71. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY§ 534 (1944).
72. C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 137, 206.
73. 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913).
74. Neponsit Property Owners' Assn. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248,
15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
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to square this with Miller v. Clary on its facts, but simply emphasized the proper application of the touching and concerning requirement. It was suspected that the court had overruled Miller
v. Clary, or at least was preparing to do so. After twenty more
years, in Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 75 the court
permitted the running of a promise to supply heat from the building on one parcel of land to the promisee's building on other land.
After relying on Neponsit and reiterating its emphasis not only
that the promise touch and concern the land, but that that requirement be ·decided by the covenant's effect rather than by
technical distinctions, the court added one enlightening sentence:
"The fear expressed that the covenant imposes an undue restriction on alienation or an onerous burden in perpetuity is dispelled
by the fact that by its terms it may run with the land only as long
as both buildings are standing and in use. " 76
The New York court recently spoke further on this matter in
Eagle Enterprises v. Gross, 77 where a corporate subdivider who
conveyed a subdivision lot promised to supply water from May 1
to October 1 of each year from a well on its land, and the grantee
promised to receive it and pay a $35 annual fee. Recovery was
denied when a successor to the grantor sued a successor to the
grantee to co_llect the fee. We may recall that in Chilcott v.
Cooke, 78 the later-repudiated English case involving a similar
covenant, the court said that it would be "perfectly monstr~ms"
to allow one who promised to supply water to terminate the obligation simply by conveying his land. In Eagle, however, it was the
grantee's successor who balked at taking and paying for the
water. The court decided in part on a narrow construction of the
touching and concerning requirement, since the obligation was
only seasonal and the defendant as well as other lot owners similarly situated were not actually dependent on the plaintiffs supply of water. Neponsit was distinguished on the ground that the
promisor there had received an easement to "utilize public areas
in the subdivision," to which the obligation to pay was related. 79
The court also noted the affirmative nature of the covenant and
cited Nicholson for the proposition that covenants are "disfavored" because of the fear that they impose "an undue restriction on alienation or an onerous burden in perpetuity." Noting
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d 832 (1959).
7 N.Y.2d at 246, 164 N.E.2d at 835.
39 N.Y.2d 505, 349 N.E.2d 816 (1976).
3 Ch. D. 694, 701 (1876).
39 N.Y.2d at 509, 349 N.E.2d at 819.
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the unlimited duration of this covenant, the court said, "Thus,
the covenant falls prey to the criticism that it creates a burden
in perpetuity, and purports to bind all future owners, regardless
of the use to which the land is put."80 On .this ground also the
covenant was not excepted from the rule against the running of
affirmative covenants.
New Jersey's Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc. 81 was a Neponsittype case in which a corporate subdivision developer conveyed to
the Beekmere Corporation an easement of access to a lake within
the subdivision and inserted in deeds to residential lots a promise
by lot owners to purchase one share of common stock in the corporation for not more than $100 and to comply with the corporation's constitution and bylaws. In a class action to construe the
covenant, the court faced early cases that seemed to support the
English rule against the running of all burdens with fee estates
at law and in favor of confining the equitable rule of Tulk v.
Moxhay to restrictive covenants. Acknowledging the New York
developments concerning affirmative burdens, especially
Neponsit and Nicholson, as well as the general acceptance of the
running of affirmative burdens elsewhere, the court concluded
that, whatever the New Jersey rule was at law, affirmative burdens should be allowed to run in equity. That conclusion is striking, for if some policy condemns the running of affirmative burdens, such a policy would seem to be more offended by specific
enforcement than by the recovery of damages for breach.
The court, however, gave two reasons for refusing to enforce
this covenant. First, the subdivision lacked a proper "neighborhood scheme, " 82 a uniformity of obligation, since the common
grantor had released a substantial number of the lots from the
covenant. Second, the covenant involved a "vagueness of terms
and consequent restraint on alienation." 83 The court mentioned
several reasons for this second conclusion. Since the covenant
obligated lot owners to conform to the corporation's bylaws,
which contained nothing pertinent to the matter, no formula
existed to calculate future assessments and thus no safeguard
existed against inequitable assessments. Also, the corporation
was not required to devote the assessed funds to the development of the subdivision. Further, the lot-owners' shares were neither transferable nor otherwise redeemable. Finally, no specific
80.
81.
82.
83.

39 N.Y.2d at 510, 349 N.E.2d at 820.
117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (Ch. Div. 1971).
117 N.J. Super. at 171, 283 A.2d at 919. ·
117 N.J. Super. at 171, 283 A.2d at 920.
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time limited the covenant's duration. The court did not say, however, that the covenant was unenforceable even against the original lot purchasers. Indeed, the reference to the .covenant as a
restraint on alienation and the fact that these plaintiffs were
successors to original purchasers justifies the inference that the
court meant merely that the covenant could not bind successors.
We might wonder why, given its concern about vagueness,
the court could not have indulged in a more liberal interpretation
of such a covenant. Could the court not have found in the covenant's obvious purpose an implicit requirement that both the
amount of the assessment and the use of the funds be limited to
necessary or reasonable improvements for the benefit of all the
residents?
One might consider these developments in New York and
New Jersey as significant only as further definitions of the process
of relaxing earlier opposition to the running of affirmative burdens. That is, one might assume that these developments are not
relevant in jurisdictions that never had any rule against the running of affirmative burdens. It is of special interest, therefore,
that these same ideas have recently appeared in other jurisdictions. In Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Association, 84 the _Arkansas court distinguished Beekmere on the
ground that sufficiently definite terms governed the promise in
question to compute an assessment and determine the use of the
proceeds. A Washington court reached a similar result in Rodruck
v. Sand Point Maintenance Commission. 85 We might also note in
Rodruck that membership in the corporate body charged with
managing the facilities and levying the assessments would, by the
terms of the bylaws, run to the successor of the member's lot, to
which his membership was appurtenant. In Japanese Gardens
Mobile Estates, Inc. v. Hunt, 86 a Florida case, mobile-home lot
owners were subject to a stated monthly assessment and to any
increased assessments approved by a majority of the lot owners.
The case did not question the running of these promises or even
whether they were valid and binding on original purchasers.
Rather, the validity of a particular increased assessment was disputed and the court remanded the case to ascertain whether the
assessment was made arbitrarily or for a proper purpose.
In respect to the duration of affirmative covenants, two
courts have recently reached the obvious conclusion that cove84. 258 Ark. 757, 764, 528 S.W.2d 651, 655 (1975).
85. 48 Wash. 2d 565, 295 P.2d 714 (1956).
86. 261 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
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nants similar to· those in Beekmere cannot violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities because the interests involved are vested. 87
A Florida Court of Appeals, however, has responded to this question somewhat differently. In Henthorn v. Tripar Land Development Corp., 88 annual subdivision charges were to continue until
January 1, 2000, and automatically for ten-year periods thereafter
unless repealed by a majority vote of the owners. The court saw
no difficulty with the initial term, but held the extension provisions invalid for the same policy reasons that invalidate interests
under the Rule Against Perpetuities. Apparently the court was
not actually applying that rule, but only borrowing its policy. Nor
did the court borrow the perpetuity period, which the covenant's
initial period exceeded. The ruling is not clear, however, for the
court cited Gray's famous perpetuity treatise at the point where
Gray states that the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to
contracts generally, but does apply to option contracts because
they are held to create equitable future interests in property. 89
Does the court contend that these covenants were valid during
the initiaf period because the property interests, if any, were
vested, but that they were void thereafter because they created
contingent future interests in property? If so, we could raise the
technical objection that such future interests were defeasible, not
contingent, since future action by the lot owners was necessary,
not to continue, but only to terminate the agreement. The court
further confused the matter by relying on an earlier case which
had startlingly concluded that lot-assessment provisions can be
terminated by either party at will upon reasonable notice if their
duration cannot be ascertained from their terms. 90 The court in
that earlier case said further that such provisions expressly made
perpetual are unenforceable in equity, because they would impose upon a court an endless and inappropriate duty of supervision.
Judicial attacks upon the duration of restrictive covenants
might seem surprising. We have lived a long time without any
explicit law on the matter. If these burdens are not wholly analogous to perpetual easements, or rather easements in fee, the equitable defense of "changed conditions" 81 may preclude the ques87. Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Assn., 258 Ark. 757, 628 S.W.2d 661
(1976); Lowry v. Norris Lake Shores Dev. Corp., 231 Ga. 649, 203 S.E.2d 171 (1974).
88. 221 So.2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
89. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETurnF.s §§ 329-330.3 (4th ed. 1942).
90. Collins v. Pie-Town Water Works, Inc., 166 So. 2d 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
91. 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (A.J. Casner ed. 1962).
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tion from arising, at least in the most common situation of equitable servitudes upon subdivision ownership. The Texas court,
however, though it found nothing in the terms of a simple restriction of property to residential use to limit its duration, dismissed
a policy argument against the restriction by saying simply that
it was not "unreasonable at this time." 92 Similarly, a Florida
court granted a petition to remove a restrictive covenant that
allegedly clouded title because of changed conditions, but added
that where such a covenant's duration has not been expressly
limited, a reasonable limitation should be implied as a matter of
construction. That is, the restriction should not endure longer
than circumstances and its purpose indicate is reasonable. 93
In certain circumstances the changed conditions defense, as
usually interpreted, may not be relevant. A Missouri court faced
with a covenant not to operate a gasoline station refused to release the promisor's successor from the restriction. 94 The court
denied that the restriction's indefinite duration was unreasonable
for, as stated in the Texas case noted above, 95 the owner of the
burdened property can challenge the restriction should it later
become unreasonable. A California court agreed to enjoin the
operation of a grocery store in violation of a covenant. The covenant was not perpetual, the court said, but valid only so long as
the promisee remains in the grocery business. 98
In respect to a matter more obviously related to direct restraints on alienation, one court has recently held that a condominium trailer park developer-grantor who reserved the exclusive right to rent the condominium units did not unreasonably
restrain alienation. 97 The court emphasized that the unit owners
were unrestricted in the sale of their units. On the other hand, a
different court held that a restriction against the sale of subdivision lots to anyone "who would be disapproved for membership
in the beach club" established for lot owners was an unreasonable
restraint on alienation. 98
92. Moore v. Smith, 443 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tex. 1969).
93. Barton v. Moline· Properties, Inc., 121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551 (1935). See also
Crissman v. Dedakis, 330 So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
94. Hall v. American Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App. 1973}.
95. Moore v. Smith, 443 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1969), discussed in text at note 92 supra.
96. Doo v. Packwood, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1968).
97. Holiday Out in America at St. Lucie, Inc. v. Bowes, 285 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973).
98. Tuckerton Beach Club v. Bender, 91 N.J. Super. 167,169,219 A.2d 529,530 (App.
Div. 1966).
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SEARCH FOR PUBLIC POLICY

In addition to the traditional requirements of contract law,
it is clear that a covenant respecting land, like conditions or
limitations in dispositive instruments, may for a variety of reasons violate public policy, even as between the original parties. 99
My concern, however, is more limited. I wish to discover what
policies, if any, are relevant not to the validity of covenants as
between the original parties, but to the running of a covenant's
burden to a successor of the promisor. This problem may also
embrace incidentally cases in which the validity of a covenant
between the original parties relates to its duration and to that
extent affects its enforceability against successors of the promisor.
My purpose in this Article is twofold. I first sought to clear
the air, or cleanse the stables, to discover which of the old, technical impediments to the running of burdens really disguise unstated or poorly conceived policy concerns. The English law may
reflect the notion that affirmative burdens are more onerous than
restrictive ones and therefore restrain alienation unreasonably,
but that policy sweeps far too broadly. At any rate, it has not been
accepted in this country. The search for policy in the American
privity-of-estate doctrine has been equally frustrating. It is not
even certain that courts apply the doctrine with any specific policy in mind. Whatever their policies may be, the courts have so
99. The most obvious are those that violate the constitutional doctrine against racial
restrictions. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For another recent example, a land
developer convenanted with a city to limit the private use of roadways within a subdivision, the covenant entitling him to declare these restrictions void if any suit were brought
to enjoin his use of the private roadway. When the plaintiffs sought a declaration of their
rights under the covenant, presumably suing as third-party beneficiaries, the court held
that the right reserved by the covenantor was void because it violated the public policy
against contracts that deny access to courts or attempt to deprive courts of their inherent
jurisdiction. This provision was especially vulnerable since it affected the rights of persons
who were not parties to the agreement. Fugazzoto v. Brookwood One, 295 Ala. 169, 325
So. 2d 161 (1976).
The validity of a provision to amend a restrictive covenant by a proper vote of lot
owners has been challenged. One court recently decided that such a provision and an
amendment made pursuant to it were valid if not unreasonable or prohibited by law,
Harrison v. Air Park Estates Zoning Comm., 533 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
"Discretionary servitudes" pose the related problem of building plans that must be approved by a developer-grantor, a committee appointed by him, or a majority oflot owners.
Most of the recent cases have approved such provisions where their enforcement is sought
reasonably, in good faith, and in furtherance of a development scheme. Rhue v. Cheyenne
Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969); Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 253, 291-300 (1976); Annot., 19 A.L.R.
2d 1274 (1951). Apart from questions of vagueness or of touching and concerning, it is not
clear what public policies these decisions involve.
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worked through and around the privity doctrine to leave it a
barren and useless impediment.
I have not concluded, however, that no policy factors govern
the running of covenants. Rather, in asserting my second purpose
I am now certain that the courts must make ~ straightforward
approach to the policy question stripped of its distracting and
outworn technical garb. That requires a tentative effort to identify the types of issues or problems that invoke policy considerations. Such an inquiry is difficult because it casts us adrift without the benefit of much judicial analysis or assessment, since
courts seldom approach the question in these terms. Since we are
searching for policies that affect the running of the burden of
covenants rather than a covenant's initial validity, we will primarily inspect the relationship between the running of covenants
and the policy against fetters on alienability.
If the courts have given us little help in our pursuit of public
policy, the Restatement at least offers a rationale against covenants burdening land, although it says little about alienability as
such. 100 The Restatement seeks to protect "the social interest in
the utilization of land" from the potential "disadvantageous effect upon its use and improvement" imposed by the burdens of
covenants respecting land. As to the running of the burdens in
equity, 101 the Restatement says that "a promise respecting the use
of land may be invalid because it unreasonably restricts the use
of land." It explains further that the restriction's harm may be
"so disproportionate to the benefit produced by the performance
of the promise that the promise ought not to be enforced." The
Restatement concedes that its rule is necessarily vague and that
determining proportions of harm and benefit will involve a variety of factors. The comment mentions several relevant factors,
including the covenant's duration. Only in respect to duration
does the Restatement's policy specifically relate to the running of
a covenant as distinguished from its initial validity.
In support of its much-criticized rule that the burden of a
covenant will not run unless its performance will physically benefit either the promisee's or the promisor's land, 102 the Restatement
rationale implies that any covenant that limits land use offends
public policy in some degree, and that no covenant will run unless
some social advantage compensates for the disadvantage caused
by the burden. The deterrent of a burden on land to a prospective
100. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537, Comment a (1944).
101. Id. § 539, Comments e, f.
102. Id. § 537, Comment a.
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purchaser, that is, the restraint on alienation, is stated as one
consequence of a burden that restricts land use. More will be said
about this section of the Restatement when referring to the touching and concerning requirement. At this point, I suggest merely
that there is no more reason to say that all covenants affecting
land use are in some degree offensive than to conclude the same
about easements. On the other hand, good reason does· exist to
find a burden on use unreasonable in some circumstances and to
say that a burden's duration may be relevant to its unreasonableness. If we say no more than this, it makes little difference
whether we characterize the policy to be against unreasonable
restrictions on land use or against restrictions on land use that
constitute unreasonable restraints upon alienation.
If we begin our pursuit of the policy reasons for protecting
alienability of property by looking at the several doctrines or
varying policies that profess to preserve alienability, we may discover why we seem to be lost at sea in identifying the policy
factors that concern the running of covenants. The Rule Against
Perpetuities, the rules against direct restraints on alienation, and
the rules governing the duration of trusts and the accumulation
of income, have all been thought to be related in policy terms.
But the policy supporting even the most clearly defined of these
doctrines, the Rule Against Perpetuities, is not clear. Does the
Rule express a concern about the economic consequences of indirectly fettered alienability or about the social consequences of too
much dead-hand control of property? 103 In any event, the Rule
rarely applies to running covenants, with the notable exception
of its application to options in gross to purchase land, 104 which
may indeed be convenants running with the land. It has long been
argued that such application is conceptually and functionally
improper. 105 New legislation has passed that exempts options
from the Rule but limits their duration to a period of years. 100
The rule against so-called direct restraints on alienation applies simply and clearly enough to one kind of restraint. Explicit
prohibitions against the alienation of land conveyed in fee simple,
including prohibitions in the form of conditions that demand
forfeiture on breach, as well as those in the form of contracts, are
illegal and void. 107 A limited doctrine allows valid partial re103. L. SIMES, PUBuc PouCY AND THE DEAD HANo 32 (1955).
104. 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY§ 24.56 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
105. Id.; Berg, Long-Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities (pts. 1-3), 37
CALIF. L. REv. 1, 235, 236, 419, 447 (1949).
106. !LI.. REv. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(7) (1973); P.A. 76-1428, § 4, eff. Sept. 22, 1969.
107. 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY§ 26.15 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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straints to deny alienation to certain persons or classes, provided
of course that the classification is not racial. 108 Generally, however, a restraint is illegal without regard to its duration. 1ai In
response to the severity of this dogma, a minority of courts have
accepted a doctrine of "reasonable restraints" which tolerates
restraints limited to certain specific periods of time. 110
The perplexing part of this law is encountered when one
turns from explicit prohibitions or restrictions upon alienation to
a variety of restrictions upon conduct (most commonly restrictions on land use) that may in effect discourage or inhibit alienability. The main difficulty here derives from certain types of encumbrances that are incontestably valid whatever their possible
effect on alienability. Most flagrant are those traditional future
interests reserved by conveyors: the possibility of reverter and the
right of entry for condition broken. Outside the panoply of estates, easements, and related servitudes are the most common
incorporeal interests in property. Not all easements inhibit alienation, but surely some do; yet I do not recall any case that held
an easement to be an unlawful restraint on alienation.
This does not mean that only explicit restrictions on alienation are unlawful. Courts have expressed concern, for instance,
that the running of options in gross to purchase land, including
preemptive options or the so-called rights of first refusal, will
inhibit alienability. As stated above, 111 regular options have
usually been subjected to the Rule Against Perpetuities and perhaps for this reason have escaped the charge that they might
unlawfully restrain alienation apart from their duration. One
might explain this by saying that an option which does in fact
inhibit alienation is a reasonable restraint if it does not last too
long. It seems odd in contrast, therefore, that most courts have
not only subjected preemptive options to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 112 but have declared that they may also constitute unreasonable restraints on alienation regardless of their duration. 113
Several factors are relevant to the unreasonableness of the restraint, the most common mark of an unreasonable restraint
being the right to buy at a fixed price rather than at the price
offered by a third person. Clearly, however, a court that under108. Id. §§ 26.31-.34.
109. Id. § 26.19.
110. Id. §§ 26.22, .23.
111. See text at note 104 supra.
112. See Browder, Restraints on the Alienation of Condominium Units, 1970 U. ILI..
L.F. 231, 248.
113. Id. at 240, 240-43.

36

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:12

takes to decide whether such a device unreasonably restrains
alienation does not thereby commit itself to the minority view
that tolerates some explicit restraints on alienation.
·Although it is sensible to distinguish direct from indirect
restraints on alienation, prevalent terminology has produced
some analytical confusion: Since the Rule Against Perpetuities is
usually designated as the rule against indirect restraints on alienation, what do we call unlawful restraints on alienation that do
not violate the Rule but that also do not purport explicitly to
restrain alienation? The term "practical restraints" 114 has been
used, or "restraints in substance." 115 Obviously not every contractual or dispositive provision that imposes some practical restraint
on alienability is unlawful. Either by its nature, or because the
benefit derived outweighs the practical harm, a practical restraint is unlawful only if the relevant circumstances reveal that
it restrains alienability unreasonably. It follows that certain
practical restraints, although not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, may still be unreasonable by virtue of their duration.
In other words, the Rule Against Perpetuities need not be the only
rule limiting the duration of an indirect impediment to alienability. This is the real meaning of the recent New York116 and New
Jersey117 developments concerning the duration of affirmative
covenants.
This is not the place for a. general exploration of the vague
dimensions or the underlying meaning of any policy or doctrine
governing restraints on alienation. At the least, it seems clear
that the courts have always been willing to consider carefully
whether certain arrangements affecting property constitute
undue practical restraints upon alienation or offend some other
identifiable public policy. 118 It is also now evident that the courts
deem that question relevant to the problem of running covenants
and that the main impediment to our understanding that problem has been the masquerading of public policy in forms that
114. Berg, supra note 105, at 10 (emphasis omitted).
115. 6 AMErucAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 26.63-.80 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
116. See text at note 75 supra.
117. See text at note 81 supra.
118. Courts frequently declare in effect that covenants affecting land use are valid if
they do not violate public policy. See, e.g., Lake View Memorial Hosp. v. County of
Vermilion, 23 Ill. App. 3d 413, 419, 318 N.E.2d 752, 756 (1974); Le Vielle v. Seay, 412
S.W.2d 587, 593 (Ky. 1967); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 492,
500, 306 N.E.2d 257, 263 (1974) (quoting statute); Boiling Spring Lakes Div. of Reeves
Telecom Corp. v. Coastal Serv. Corp., 27 N.C. App. 191, 218 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1975); Loeb
v. Watkins, 428 Pa. 480, 484, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (1968); Vickery v. Powell, 267 S.C. 23, 28,
225 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1976).
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either hide their policy basis or distract attention from it.
A search for policy limitations on the running of covenants
is bound to concentrate on the running of affirmative burdens. It
will also embrace whatever policy is found to support the old
touching and concerning doctrine. If one rejects the English condemnation of the running of all affirmative burdens, the fact
remains that most affirmative burdens are more burdensome
than most restrictive ones. 119 That a variety of covenants restrict
a subdivision in order to preserve a residential neighborhood may
often not seem a burden at all. On the other hand, obligations to
perform certain acts, including the payment of money, may be
felt as physically or financially objectionable. Affirmative burdens, however, do not necessarily impose more objectionable fetters on alienability than restrictive ones, though they have peculiar intricacies not yet fully fathomed in policy terms nor carefully
differentiated for policy purposes.
Consider first the most common and simple type of covenant,
like that in Neponsit, 120 to pay for the maintenance of facilities
that benefit subdivision lot owners. Covenants to pay money have
always been suspect under the touching and concerning requirement, especially in the landlord-tenant relation, despite the fact
that a covenant to pay rent has always run with a leasehold,
estate. Similarly, subdivision assessments are now generally conceded to touch and concern the promisor's lot, for the benefit
acquired with the payments clearly enhances the enjoyment and
value of his land and often relieves the promisor from maintaining his own property in certain ways. The question has seldom
arisen whether the benefit of his promise concerns land of the
promisee. The promisee or the beneficiary of the promise will
likely be a corporation organized to manage the provision of services. As in Neponsit, one can consider the corporate enforcement
agency merely a representative of the lot owners themselves or an
intermediary between one lot owner and all others, so that in
substance the benefit of the covenant touches and concerns the
land of all other lot owners. In this case, it hardly seems necessary
that the intermediate agency, corporate or otherwise, own land
119. In Lloyd, Enforcement of Affirmative Agreements Respecting the Use of Land,
14 VA. L. REv. 419, 431 (1928), the author concludes with this statement:
But such agreements if a perpetual clog on the title are more conspicuously objectionable than those purely restrictive and call even more for a fixed limit to their,
duration. So limited, affirmative restrictions would seem to differ from negative in
social advantage and disadvantage less in kind than in degree.
120. Neponsit Property Owners' Assn. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248,
16 N.E.2d 793 (1938), discussed in text at note 74 supra.
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within the subdivision with which the benefit of the covenant will
run.
Public policy in this situation concerns either the covenant's
duration or its vagueness. Does the equitable defense of changed
conditions resolve the duration problem? Although available to
an original purchaser-promisor, this defense obviously affects the
running of a covenant as well. Is it a rule of policy? Courts never
speak of it as such; they merely say that a covenant can no longer
be enforced when circumstances frustrate the purposes of the
restriction. 121 At most, courts label enforcement in such circumstances inequitable. One might infer, as a rule of construction,
that the parties intended the obligation to continue only so long
as its evident purpose could be achieved. In any case, the rule can
be justified as one of policy, so that upon changes of certain
conditions, the obligation may become an unreasonable burden
on land use, and in fact an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
In policy terms, no reason exists to limit that rule to the
traditional kinds of changed conditions that courts have invoked
as a defense to the enforcement of equitable servitudes. It ought
to apply, for example, to cases not involving the complexities of
a subdivision scheme. Indeed there is no limit to the kinds of
conceivable circumstances relevant to this problem. Similarly,
although the defense of changed conditions is usually raised respecting restrictive covenants, l see no reason against applying it
to affirmative burdens also. If changed conditions invalidated
subdivision restrictions, however, it does not necessarily follow
that affirmative promises respecting subdivision services also
become unenforceable, for the two are not necessarily related.
Confining the changed conditions rule to equitable proceedings creates an anomaly if, without regard to changed conditions,
a covenant can be enforced at law and remain a cloud on title. 122
It is not unprecedented to extend equitable defenses to actions at
law. In any event, the termination of a covenant under proper
changed conditions can be declared a requirement of public policy both at law and in equity. In other words, where the defense
of changed conditions, on the basis of precedent, is not applicable, it would remain open to a court, in respect to restrictive as
well as affirmative covenants, and both at law and in equity, to
declare that the burden of a convenant is extinguished where
under particular circumstances it has become unreasonable.
121. 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.39 at 446 (A.J. Casner ed. 1962).
122. Id.
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As previously mentioned, public policy in the subdivision
situation also questions the vagueness of a promise concerning
subdivision management, as in Beekmere. 123 Construction may
solve this problem; courts can· infer that the amount of an assessment and the use of acquired funds are limited to providing
proper maintenance or recognized ·services. Where that cannot
be implied, the covenant's vagueness may indeed unreasonably
fetter alienability, and so not run with. the· units of land even
where contract principles would not void the covenant on that
ground as between the original parties.
Consider a variant of the typical subdivision-assessment covenant: a covenant to furnish a service or other benefit to the land
of the promisee. This is the Nicholson 12' type of case. The promisor in that case convenanted to supply heat from his building to
the promisee's building. Both the burden and the benefit of the
promise clearly touched and concerned the land of the respective
parties. The Nicholson court resolved the most obvious policy
problem, the obligation's duration, by recognizing an inherent
time limitation: the life of the two buildings. It may seem preferable to handle the problem as suggested above in regard to the
changed-conditions rule. 1211 In any event, courts should not void
the covenant solely because it may last too long. The covenant
should be valid unless and until changed conditions render it an
unreasonable restraint on the alienation of the burdened land.
It may merely be borrowing trouble to mention certain unlikely variants of this type of case, but one cannot shy from the
margins of normal practices and expectations when testing the
requirements of public policy. Landlords or tenants occasionally
promise to pay the taxes on leased land or for utilities. 128 Suppose
instead that a grantee of land in fee simple promised to pay for
improvements or taxes on land of the grantor or for the grantor's
utilities. The benefit of that promise touches and concerns the
grantor's land, but by traditional standards the burden is in
gross. Can the parties nevertheless bind the successors of the
promisor by an explicit provision in the deed? This raises a fundamental question about the policy basis of the touching and concerning requirement: Is that requirement more than a rule of
123. Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 N.J. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (Ch. Div. 1971),
discussed in text at note 81 supra.
124. Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d 832 (1959),
discussed in text at note 75 supra.
125. See text at note 121 supra.
126. 2 AMErucAN LAw OF PRoPERl'Y § 9.4 at 347 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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construction, that is, a means of inferring the intention of the
parties? The parties can clearly make the burden of a simple
promise to pay money a lien upon the promisor's land. Even the
English rule against the running of all affirmative burdens does
not reach cases involving rent-charges or perhaps even liens. If
the promise is to make a lump-sum payment for all or part of
some improvement to the land of the promisee, the analogy to a
mortgage seems obvious, except that a mortgage lien binds the
land of the mortgagee without imposing a running personal obligation. Where the parties clearly intended to bind the promisor's
successors, however, courts have been known to construe such a
promise as in effect the creation of a lien. Does the creation of a
lien require explicit technical language? Even if it does, is the
difference between an explicit lien and an explicit imposition on
the promisor's successor of a promise to pay money really important as a matter of public policy? The burden of a promise to pay
a lump sum restrains alienation no more than a lien or a mortgage; it will simply be accounted for in fixing the purchase price
of the burdened land. To this limited extent, at least, cannot the
original parties, by their own fiat, make the burden of the promise
touch and concern the land of the promisor? 127 To reach such a
conclusion it is not necessary to construe every promise to pay
money as creating a lien binding the property itself rather than
personally binding a successor. of the promisor.
The duration of such a lump-sum promise presents no problem either. Normally the parties will contemplate that the improvement to be paid for will be made within a reasonable time.
Even if they do not, the continuing burden will simply reduce the
value of the promisor's land by a calculable amount that can be
reflected in a later sale. If, however, the parties leave the extent
of the improvement, and so the burden of the obligation to pay
for it, so indefinite as not to be calculable within reasonable limits, it may then indeed become an unreasonable fetter on alienability. As in the cases mentioned above that involved vague property assessments, 128 the burden should not run.
Suppose, however, that the promise cannot be discharged
with a lump-sum payment. For instance, a covenant to maintain
or repair a fence, bridge, or other structure requires the promisor
127. Cf. Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MtNN,
L. R.Ev. 167, 231 (1970) (purchaser seeing promise to pay for existing improvements in prior
deed of land ought to realize that promise bound predecessor as owner of the land and
burden ought to run).
128. See text at note 81 supra.
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to pay recurrent charges. By analogy to the above analysis concerning liens and mortgages, a recurrent obligation between owners in fee simple amounts to something like a "ground rent" or a
"quit rent." Ground rents are not generally recognized in this
country, 129 however, because history and the doctrine of estates
deny that owners in fee simple share the tenure relationship requisite to charging rent. But is so conceptual a response really a
persuasive policy argument against the running of this type of
promise? Arguably it is not, since the reasonableness of the restraint on alienation turns on the particular circumstances of the
case. In-any case, we may argue that the touching and concerning
requirement is not an invariable rule of public policy. Even where
it is not satisfied in the traditional sense, as in this example .where
the burden is in gross, the running of a burden should be denied
only if that will unreasonably restrain alienation.
As in Eagle Enterprises, 130 two kinds of affirmative covenants
can be combined. The grantor, his grantee, or one of two neighboring landowners, could promise either to furnish a service or
other benefit, or to accept and pay for the services of the other.
The considerations discussed above as to either kind of promise
separately seem applicable.
Consider now the least plausible kind of case in order to test
further the touching and concerning requirement as a rule of
policy. Suppose an eccentric grantor wishes to induce certain
conduct by his grantee and his successors that has nothing to do
with any land. His attempt to bind successors to a covenant
requiring that conduct would very likely impose a severe restraint
on alienation; if so, the covenant should be void whether the
conduct is affirmative or restrictive. In fact, I cannot now think
of a restrictive covenant that would not be void if it fails to satisfy
a reasonable application of the touching and concerning requirement. Clearly, therefore, the touching and concerning requirement, when applied to restrictive covenants and to affirmative
covenants not requiring the payment of money, does contain a
policy ingredient.
Conceding that public policy supports the touching and concerning requirement to a considerable extent is no excuse for
taking a narrow view of that requirement. No reason exists for
applying a more restrictive standard than that declared by Judge
129. See 2 AMEruCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.41 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
130. Eagle Enterprises v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 349 N.E.2d 816 (1976), discussed in
text at note 77 supra.
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Clark131 in terms of the ordinary layman's expectation and assumptions. The main issue in this regard relates to covenants
that affect land economically but not physically, most obviously
covenants governing business competition. The view that covenants must physically touch and concern the land can be supported only by the notion that running burdens inherently prejudice the public interest and so must be kept within the narrowest
possible bounds. Assuming that competition covenants do not
violate the policy against restraints on trade, the current trend of
the cases 132 no longer supports the narrow view of such covenants133 first declared in Massachusetts134 and supported by the
Restatement. 135 Even Massachusetts has now questioned that
view in principle. 138
Apart from the competition problem, suppose a promise does
in fact touch and concern the land of the promisor but the benefit
is in gross. That burden will clearly not run in equity in England, 137 and substantial but divided authority to the same effect
exists in this country .138 At least in the Restatement's view, 139 that
rule is one of public policy, based on the assumption mentioned
above that all land-use restrictions are objectionable and can be
justified only if a benefit to the land of either the promisor or the
promisee accompanies the burden. But no one requires such a
131. C. CLARK, supra note 6, at 99. Judge Clark's statement was made in reference
to covenants between landlord and tenant. There is no reason to believe that he intended
anything different for covenants between owners in fee simple.
132. Doo v. Packwood, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1968); Hall v. American Oil Co., 504 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App. 1973); Alexander's Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Arnold
Constable Corp., 105 N.J. Super. 14, 260 A.2d 792 (Ch. Div. 1969); Quadro Stations, Inc.
v. Gilley, 7 N.C. App. 237, 172 S.E.2d 237 (1970); Gillen-Crow Pharmacies, Inc. v. Mandzak, 5 Ohio St. 2d 201, 215 N.E.2d 377 (1966). Contra, Savings, Inc. v. City ofBlytheville,
240 Ark. 558, 401 S.W.2d 26 (1966) (also found covenant not intended to run); Clear Lake
City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utile. Co., 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977).
133. 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.13, n.35 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
134. Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885).
135. REsTATEMENT OF PRoPERTY § 537, Comment f (1944), takes the position that the
benefit of such a promise will run, but that the burden will not, under the proposition
that a burden will not run where the benefit does not physically touch and concern land.
136. Shell Oil Co. v. Henry Ouellette & Sons Co., 352 Mass. 725, 227 N.E.2d 509
(1967); cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 492, 306 N.E.2d 257 (1974),
where Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885), was distinguished on the
ground that here the purpose of the covenant was not to limit competition but to assure
the orderly and mutually beneficial development of the area.
137. London County Council v. Allen, [1914) 3 K.B. 642.
138. 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY§ 9.32, nn.5-7 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
139. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944). This section applies only to the running
of burdens at law. Apparently the rule does not apply to the running of burdens in equity.
Id. § 539, Comment k. As in the case of horizontal privity, one may wonder about the force
of a rule of policy that applies at law but not in equity.
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justification of easements in gross. 140 In any event, the rule is
quite mechanical since no effort is prescribed to weigh benefits
in relation to burdens, which vary greatly in their weight or degree. It may seem preferable to defeat the running of burdens
where the benefit is in gross only if in all the circumstances the
covenant unreasonably restrains alienation.
Why cannot a grantor convey land with a restrictive promise
that the land be used only for a wildlife sanctuary or some other
environmentally beneficial purpose? If this can be done by a condition or limitation, breach of which may produce forfeiture, why
cannot it also be done by a covenant? Granted that the benefit
probably is in gross and that the restriction obviously fetters
alienation, if such a restriction on land use nonetheless serves
the public interest, no reason exists why it should be held an unreasonable restraint on alienation. As a practical matter there
are of course better ways of obtaining such an objective than by
the use of conditions, limitations, or covenants.
The rule against the running of burdens where the benefit is
in gross has usually been applied to restrictive covenants. Affirmative burdens of this sort are certainly not common, but the kind
of case mentioned in the preceding paragraph could involve affirmative promises in support of the environmentally beneficial
purposes. If so, the same analysis should produce the same result.
The duration of such an arrangement, whether affirmative
or negative, seems not to raise problems except as changed conditions may render the burden no longer reasonable. However,
one other aspect of the problem of the running of burdens with
benefits in gross is more troublesome. In Atchison v. City of
Englewood, 141 the court decided that a pre-emptive option to purchase land (a right of first refusal) held by a married couple and
their successors, and unlimited in time, violated the Rule Against
Perpetuities. A majority of the courts that have ruled on the
question support that result with the technical analysis that an
option creates a contingent future interest in land. 142 The court
in Atchison, however, gave a special reason for its decision. Such
an option, unlike an option appendant to property of the optionee, would seriously impair the alienability of the land subject
to the option, for the owner of that land might have considerable
difficulty tracing the ownership of the option and the location of
140. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 454, 490-91 (1944). The latter two sections deal
with the alienability of easements in gross.
141. 170 Colo. 295, 463 P.2d 297 (1969).
142. See Browder, supra note !12, at 248.
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successive owners. The same sort of argument has been made
against the assignment of easements in gross. This difficulty exists to some degree with the alienability of rights of entry and of
possibilities of reverter, but has never bothered the courts.
I know of no other case in which the court analyzed an option
in gross in that manner. However sound the decision may be
respecting options, it does not seem applicable to the usual covenants respecting land use, which will rarely be framed so as to be
subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. The real problem of
course is whether a covenant constitutes an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The Atchison court conceded that, but applied the Rule Against Perpetuities nevertheless because that
seemed the only way to control the duration of an option. But the
doctrine of changed conditions and a decree terminating the covenant can control the duration of covenants respecting land use.
Surely established procedures exist for raising that question even
if the identity or location of the promisee is unknown. The difficulty in finding the promisee seems to impede alienability on this
score only where a successor to the promisor wishes to negotiate
a release. It is at least arguable that that difficulty alone does not
make the running of the burden of a covenant where the benefit
is in gross an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
lN

CONCLUSION

Property lawYers and teachers are accustomed to jibes from
their colleagues about how outworn relics of the past still govern
the law of property. In fact, when dealing with property problems
the courts as well as legislatures are generally proving themselves
to be as responsive to current needs and are keeping that law as
"relevant" as in any other field. But otherwise discredited epithets still have some justification in the law on covenants running
with the land. One of my purposes in this Article was to emphasize in some detail why and to what extent this is so.
Modern English courts did adapt or avoid old notions to
fashion a simple though highly restrictive doctrine on running
covenants; but that doctrine is not a relic of the past, unless in
the light of currently developing English conditions a nineteenthcentury doctrine can be so described. However, little explanation
has ever appeared for making that doctrine so restrictive.
As the need to develop an American doctrine emerged in the
nineteenth century, the American courts were understandably
confused about what the old law really required, as well as about
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what the English courts were really doing in concurrently evolving the doctrine of equitable servitudes. As a result, a horizontal
privity of estates requirerµent that bears little resemblance to
anything in England has survived and evolved. The only sensible
thing that can be said for it is that it represented an effort to
liberalize an English rule felt to be too harsh for American conditions.
The oldest relic of all is the touching and concerning requirement. It is now seen to be more than a relic, to have current
vitality and relevance, but where courts have only vague, unstated feelings or fears that running covenants may offend public
policy, they may impose the requirement with too restrictive a
meaning.
Most current cases in the field escape these problems. They
usually determine whether a purchaser of burdened land purchased with or without notice of the burden in light of the American recording system; or they question who can enforce' a subdivision restriction among a number of neighbors who may or
may not be similarly situated. The latter problem has its own
special intricacies but it would extend this Article unduly to
pursue them. I have the impression that for the most part courts
handle these questions satisfactorily and without dogmatic impediments. Apart from these matters courts continue to stumble
over privity or other too restrictive notions.
In my effort to seek solid public policy bases for any restrictions upon running covenants, I have refused to assume or assert
that there are none. One can never predict all the kinds of covenants people may want to make that seem to offend the public
interest, although the most obvious and likely offense is the running of a covenant in circumstances that violate the policy
against restraints on alienation. Unfortunately, the essence of
that policy and the conditions to which it is relevant remain
undefined when invoked in this and other fields. The duration of
a covenant, especially of one imposing an affirmative burden,
presents the most likely source of contention. I have suggested the
desirability of reserving a judgment against validity on this
ground until circumstances reveal that the covenant has become
unreasonable. There is no place in that judgment to declare by
analogy to perpetuities that a covenant is void because it may last
too long.
The touching and concerning requirement can continue to
serve best as a rule of construction on the question of parties'
intent that a covenant run. Cases will occasionally appear where
the parties' expressly declared intention that the covenant run is
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defeated because the covenant's failure to concern land leaves it
to operate as an unreasonable fetter on alienation. Some further
thought may be desirable, for instance, on the peculiar nature of
affirmative covenants to pay money, but I have suggested that
here the touching and concerning requirement may disappear as
a rule of policy, for the original parties may be taken to have tied
the covenant to land by their own expression of intent.
Finally, the American recording statutes should be clarified
or modified by construction or amendment where necessary to
provide that any properly executed promise that either benefits
or burdens land shall be recordable and consequently affect the
law regarding notice and bona fide purchase.
My main plea is that courts face the policy question headon. They have not been embarrassed or reluctant to do so in other
areas when the question is presented openly and directly. The
question will be presented in that manner if the courts free themselves from rules or attitudes that exemplify vague notions of
public policy in disguise.
A law review note written forty years ago primarily about the
running of affirmative burdens ends by proposing that until the
effects of affirmative covenants upon alienability are empirically
analyzed, the "controlling considerations should be the doctrines
of intent and notice," presumably with respect to both affirmative and restrictive covenants. 143 My view is not far from this. No
factual analyses regarding alienability have been forthcoming,
however, nor can they be expected in view of the nature and
variety of alienability problems. In their absence, courts must
deal with the policies concerning alienability as they have in
other areas-on the basis of unproved inferences and assessments. This problem does not yet permit the enumeration of any
organized, specific doctrine. Courts may well proceed primarily
with the doctrine of intent and notice, provided they remain alert
to perceive the effects of running covenants upon the alienability
of land. I have sought here to offer assessments of several existing
or anticipated problems in that regard.
143. Note, 47 YALE L. J. 821, 827 (1938).

